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Abstract 
 
 
We run an economic experiment in order to find out the preferences of altruism, envy, and guilt at 
individual level. We extend Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) series of Dictator Experiments and Fisman et 
al.’s (2007) graphical experiment in order to have additional and more precise data at individual level. 
We run 55 graphical dictator games including some with a positive relation between the money the 
Dictator and the Receiver obtain, in order to estimate individual preferences for envy and guilt. Our 
program is interactive, as it looks for the regions where individuals´ emotions change from altruist to 
envy, and altruism to guilt, and changes the form of the budget sets. We find that most individuals 
show the emotion of altruism when facing other individuals that have similar income as themselves. 
However, some individuals show the emotion of envy when facing other individuals with much higher 
payoffs than themselves. More surprisingly, some individuals reveal the emotion of guilt when they 
have much higher payoffs that other individuals.  
 
  
 I. Introduction 
Most people have the emotion of altruism, and many people have emotions of envy and guilt. 
Many times, the same person has several emotions in different situations. For example, an 
individual may feel altruistic toward another individual in distress and the same person may feel 
envy toward somebody that has higher income than her. The objective of this paper is to design 
and conduct an economic experiment that allows us to estimate three different emotions at 
individual level: altruism, envy and guilty and to find in which situations each emotion is revealed. 
We use Andreoni and Miller (2002) series of Dictator Experiments and extend Fisman et al. (2007) 
graphic experiment in order to have additional and more precise data.  
Andreoni and Miller (2002) developed a series of Dictator Games in order to estimate preferences 
of altruism. Although they obtain information at individual level that allows them to classify 
individual preferences (Leontief, perfect substitutes, weak Leontief, weak substitutes), their data is 
not large enough to estimate preferences at individual level (they estimate an aggregation of the 
preferences for the individuals that belong to each category). In some sessions of their 
experiment, Andreoni and Miller added some additional questions in order to find out if some 
individuals also have preferences of “jealous” (in this paper we refer to this emotion as envy). 
They find that 23% of their subjects have preferences of envy. Although Andreoni and Miller did 
not disclose how altruistic these individuals were, we can guess that some of their subjects have 
both emotions of altruism and envy. The objective of this paper is to extend their experiment in 
order to have a more comprehensive understanding of which situations an individual have each 
emotion of altruism and envy. Additionally, we included the emotion of guilt. 
We hypothesize that the same individual may display these emotions in different situations, 
depending on their relative income or wealth as compared with the income of others. When 
having relatively equal amounts of wealth, we believe that individuals may have the emotion of 
altruism. However, we hypothesize that individuals may feel envy toward other individuals that 
have a much higher income than them, and they may feel guilty toward other individuals that have 
a much lower income than them. To test these hypothesizes, we group individuals in pairs and let 
them play a series of Dictator games. We divide the set of possible incomes of each pair of players 
in three different regions of relative income where each emotion may be present. In order for 
individuals to reveal each emotion, we use different budget sets in each of these regions. The 
emotions we will to analyze could be defined as: 
Altruism. An individual reveals the emotion of altruism if she is willing to sacrifice her own income 
in order to increase the income of another individual. If we represent in a graph in the vertical axe 
the income of the Dictator and in the horizontal axe the income of the Receptor, preferences for 
altruism would be represented by indifference curves with a negative slope. In order to analyze 
these preferences we use standard budget restrictions with a negative slope.  
Envy. An individual reveals the emotion of envy if she is willing to sacrifice her income in order to 
decrease the income of another individual. Graphically we could represent these preferences with 
indifference curves that have positive slope. We use budget constraint with a positive slope in 
order to analyze preferences for envy.  
Guilt We call as “guilt”, the emotion where an individual does not like having much more wealth 
than others and is willing to sacrifice her own wealth in order to decrease this difference.  
 
Fisman et al. (2007) create a graphical interface to extend Andreoni and Miller series of Dictator 
games, which allows them to obtain more data and more precise information at individual level. 
Individuals decided on 50 dictator games (which graphically were standard budget sets), which 
provide them with enough information for estimating preferences for altruism at individual level.  
As Fisman et al., we use a graphical interface, which allow us to increase the amount of 
information and the precision of the data at individual level. We run 55 dictator games; 37 of 
those dictator games are standard and we use them to analyze individuals’ emotion of altruism. 
However, we also use 18 non-standard budget sets in order to analyze the emotions of envy and 
guilt.  
An individual that has the emotion of altruism has indifference curves with negative slope. An 
individual that has the emotion of envy or guilt, has indifference curves with positive slopes. An 
individual that has the emotions of altruism, envy and guilt at the same time must have 
indifference curves that change the sign of her slope at some point. To find out the approximate 
region where the preferences change the sign of their slope, we use vertical and horizontal budget 
restrictions. An interior choice in a vertical or horizontal budget constraint indicates that the 
indifference curves change the sign of their slope.  
Our program is interactive, as it looks for these interior choices in vertical and horizontal budget 
constraints in order to find the regions where individuals’ preferences change from altruist to envy 
or guilt and adapts the shapes of the budget sets in function of these interior choices in order to 
better study each individual’s emotions of envy and guilt. 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) use Afriat’s (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency 
Index (CCEI) in order to measure individual consistency. If we reduce the income in every budget 
set, eventually every violation to the Axiom of Revealed Preference from a set of choices is 
eliminated. The CCEI measures the consistency of a set of choices as the smaller reduction that is 
necessary for every violation to the Axioms of Revealed preference to be eliminated. However, 
given that we include non-standard budget restrictions with vertical, horizontal and positive 
slopes, some of which part from the origin, and therefore have an income of zero, we cannot use 
the CCEI. Instead, we use Echenique’s (2011) Money Pump Index (MPI) to measure how consistent 
are individuals’ choices. Individuals act inconsistently if they choose a higher quantity of an option 
in a period when it is more expensive that option and choose less of an option when that option is 
cheaper. In theory, an arbitrer could earn money by buying each option when it is cheap and 
selling it to the subject when it is expensive. The MPI measures the consistency by the amount of 
money it can be made by arbitraging between the individuals’ inconsistent decisions. The MPI has 
the advantage with respect to the CCEI that can measure inconsistent behavior even with non-
standard budget sets. 
The results of the paper are the following 
We find that the mean number of violations to GARP is 10 and each subject lost 172 of possible 
Mexican pesos on average by their inconsistent behavior. That is, on average each subject left 
under the table 12 % of the money they could have won (or given). 
Unsurprisingly, we find that most individuals have the emotion of altruism. However, when facing 
a region where other individuals have much more income than them, some individuals’ emotion 
changes to envy (19 out of 41 subjects). More surprisingly, we find that many individuals have the 
emotion of guilt (15 out of 41 subjects) in a region where other individuals have much less income 
than them.  
 
In section II, we explain in detail the experimental design. In section III we analyze the consistency 
of each individual’s choices. In section IV we analyze the results. And in section V we conclude.  
 
 
II. Experimental Design  
The experiment consists in a set of 55 dictator games. In each game the dictator chooses a tuple 
from a continuous set of possible token distributions between himself and another player, the 
receiver. Each player plays both roles, as dictator in his game and the receiver of another game. 
Players where linked randomly in a way that there where no closed ties, so a player will be always 
the receiver of someone who was not their receiver.  
The interface is graphical, showing an area. The axes represent the number of tokens the dictator 
will keep and the amount the receiver will collect. Distributions are limited to a maximum of 140 
tokens per participant, while the shown area is a 150 tokens square, so the limits of the 
distribution set are visible. The dictator can choose any point in the area, leaving the possibility of 
non-efficient choices. The chosen point is also shown numerically at the right side of the graph. 
The choice is not made effective until the dictator presses the “next” button in the right part of the 
graph (figure 1).  
 Figure 1. Experiments graphical interface. Since the experiment was made in Mexico labels are in Spanish, English 
translation in red. Instructions for the experiment where available at any moment pressing the “instructions” button 
under the graph. 
In literature it is usual to relate the problem to a budget constraint with a transference price. 
Using that approach, in our experiment, the transference price can take negative values, zero or 
even infinite, so we prefer to talk about a set of possible distributions, as an area where the 
dictator must choose. Each set is continuous and convex, bounded, and therefore compact. The 
set always contains the origin (0,0), so to give and receive nothing is always an option. The set is 
shaped as a triangle in most cases, but rectangles and rectangle trapezoid also appear. 
In the first 37 games the distributions are limited by a triangle in the sense of a positive price of 
transmission and a negative slope, so in the border of the set giving to the receiver reduces the 
dictator’s tokens (figure 1). The slopes (ratio of prices) take just eleven different values, namely 1, 
1.25, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 4/5, 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5 and 1/7. The first slopes of each set appear three 
times and the last just twice.  The 1 slope distributions correspond to maximum of 20, 40 and 60 
tokens, the rest in a way that four (2,3,5,7) will cross slope one at 1/3, other four (1/2, 1/3, 1/5, 
1/7) at 2/3 and other four (1.25,  1.5, 4/5, 2/3) in the middle point, in the case of 20 and 40, for 60 
only three cross at 1/3 and three at 2/3 (2,3,5 and 1/2, 1/3 and 1/5 respectively). We can group 
the figures in a way that the 60 tokens slope one figure is related to other 10 distributions, forming 
a group of 11, when 40 and 20 generate groups of 13 distributions each. For each slope we obtain 
three parallel borders of the distribution set, except for 7 and 1/7 where only two parallels where 
set. Since in the previous literature a usual choice in dictator games is 1/2 to the receiver and 2/3 
for the dictator, the crossing points where chosen accordingly.  
In the next 6 games the distributions are shaped as a rectangle, three of them with height 140 and 
bases 1, 6.66 and 10, three with base 140 and height 1, 6.66 and 10. They represent infinite and 
zero cost of transmission (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. 
In the last 12 games the distributions where limited by a triangle, or a possible trapezoid, with a 
positive slope, implying a negative price of transmission, giving tokens to the receiver increases 
the dictator’s tokens. In each case the triangle has one of his vertices at the origin (zero tokes for 
both). In 6 cases the distribution is constructed in a way that the election is the area under the 
positive slope line, so that for a given value of tokens given to the receiver, the amount the 
dictator can assign himself is limited above, or, to give himself a higher amount, he has to increase 
the amount given to the receiver (figure 3), and for the other 6 cases for a given amount of tokes 
of the dictator, the amount he can give to the receiver is limited above, or, as more he assign 
himself, the more he can give to the receiver (figure 3). This difference is relevant form a 
psychological point of view.    
 Figure 3. 
The positive slopes (negative prices) where 3 and 1/3, generating triangles. The rest where 
established according to individual choices in for of the rectangle distributions. The internal slope 
of the triangle was determined with the origin (0,0) and the choice made for base 10 and 6.66 or 
height 10 and 6.66, another with the 90% of that slope, and for the case of base or height 10 the 
66.66% (2/3) of that slope.  
Observe that if individuals used traditional utility functions for the rectangles, the optimal choices 
are corner solutions (max possible payment for each player), so the dependent slopes would we 
equal for everybody. Only if the player chooses to distribute in a way that technically available 
tokens are not distributed, the slopes would we different accordingly. Since the slopes where 
choice dependent, in some cases a trapezoidal distribution set aroused (figure 4).   
 Figure 4. 
During the experiment the individual faced the restrictions organized by groups, but randomly 
inside every group. Subjects were not aware that their choice in the second set will determine the 
slopes of the last group. 
The experiment was performed in groups of 14 subjects in a computer room, three sessions where 
performed during the same day. Subjects where students of the University of Guanajuato, mainly 
from the economic and administrative area, who voluntarily applied for participation. There are 7 
mayors in the Economics and administrative division and an equitable participation was intended, 
also a 50% participation for each gender was intended.  
As a payoff one round was randomly chosen to be realized, the dictator will receive it´s part of the 
distribution and other randomly chosen subject of the session will be the receiver. Each subject 
received the dictator part from their chosen round and the receiver part of other subject’s 
experiment. Subjects were aware of this payment method. Also a show-up fee was paid.  
At the beginning of each session instructions where read aloud, with the support of a projection, 
and possible questions were answered. Instructions where available during the whole experiment 
pressing the instructions button. When subjects started the experiment they had a single trial-run 
before starting with the real experiment.   
  
 III. Consistency 
 
 
Before we estimate individuals’ utility functions, we test for the consistency of individuals’ choices. 
According to Afriat (1966), if individuals behave consistently, their behavior can be represented 
with a well behaved utility function. We test for consistency by testing if individuals’ choices 
violate or satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference.  
 
Note that we can use GARP even if we analyze emotions that imply preferences that might be not 
monotone, as individuals may choose to sacrifice their own income in order to decrease the 
income of another individuals in the emotion of envy, or they sacrifice their income in order to 
decrease its difference with the income of another individual in the emotion of guilt.  
 
Once we test for individual consistency, we can use Afriat theorem to find a utility function that 
represents their behavior. According to Afriat (1967), if the data satisfies “cyclical consistency”, 
then there exists a non-satiated, continuous, concave and monotonic utility function that 
rationalizes this data. Varian (1981) shows that satisfying cyclical consistency is equivalent to 
GARP.   
 
We test for consistency by testing if individuals’ choices satisfy the GARP. However, evaluating 
consistency by analyzing if it the data satisfies GARP is too strict a criterion for our experiment, as 
the number of choices is large (55 choices) and almost every individual has a violation of the GARP, 
even if small. Andreoni and Miller (2002), and Fisman et.al (2007) use the CCEI index, developed 
by Afriat (1966) in order to test for consistency.  
 
If we reduce the income in every budget restriction, each violation to GARP would eventually be 
eliminated. The CCEI measures consistency as the constant 𝑒 ≤ 1 by which the income has to be 
multiplied in order for every violation to GARP to be eliminated. In this sense, 1 − 𝑒 is the size of 
the largest violation to GARP. In figure 1, the size of the violation to GARP is represented by the 
percentage that the income should be reduced in the budget restriction B in order to reach point 
A, in which case the violation would disappear (or in the percentage the income in budget 
restriction A should be reduced in order to reach point B, whichever reduction in income is 
smaller). However, for our experiment we cannot use the CCEI, as it is designed to test consistency 
in standard budget sets and some of our budget sets are non-standard. 
 
Instead, we use Echenique et al.’s (2011) Money Pump Index (MPI from now on) to measure how 
consistent are individuals’ choices. The MPI measures consistency (or inconsistency) by the 
amount of money it can be made by arbitraging between the individuals’ inconsistent decisions. 
When an individual behaves inconsistently, she o he has chosen two (or more) products, where 
she has chosen more of the products when they were more expensive and less when they were 
cheaper. Theoretically, an arbitrager could profit from a violation to GARP by buying each product 
in the period when it is cheaper and selling it in the period when the product is more expensive.  
 
For our experiment, the money pump index is better that the CCEI because, in a set of choices, the 
CCEI only takes into account the largest violation, and the CCEI can only be used to measure 
violations from standard budget constraints (with negative slopes), while the MPI uses the 
information of every violation to GARP and can be used with nonstandard budget restrictions with 
different slopes, as it is the case in our experiment. 
 
From Figure 1, we can see a violation of GARP. And individual that chose bundle A at prices 𝑝஺ and 
bundle B at prices 𝑝஻, made and inconsistency by buying more of each good when they were 
expensive and less when they were cheap. We could potentially arbitrage by buying the bundle A 
at prices 𝑝஻ and sell it at prices 𝑝஺, and buying the bundle B at prices 𝑝஺ and selling it a prices 𝑝஻.  
 
An arbitrager could earn profit 𝑚𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥ᇱ) + 𝑝′(𝑥′ − 𝑥) from these inconsistencies. The MPI 
is the addition of all possible profits an arbitrager could earn from all inconsistencies, of first, 
second, third, fourth degree, and so on, divided by the total expenditure of the individual in order 
to compare it relative to all the money expended.  
 
The MPI is given by the formula: 
 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐼൛൫௫ೖభ ,௣ೖభ൯,…,൫௫ೖ೙ ,௣ೖ೙൯ൟ =
∑ 𝑝௞೗௡௟ୀଵ ∙ ൫𝑥௞೗ − 𝑥௞೗శభ൯
∑ 𝑝௞೗௡௟ୀଵ ∙ 𝑥௞೗
,              (𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘௡ାଵ = 𝑘ଵ) 
 
 
The MPI can measure violations to GARP even when subjects face non-standard budget sets. The 
only difference with the case of standard budget sets is that the price of one of the goods is 
negative.  
 
In table 1, we show the results of the MPI. Of the 41 subjects in our experiment, 37 had at least 
one violation to the axiom of revealed preference. However, these violations are not large. For the 
cycle of length two the MPI is around 6% of the average of the income of the questions where the 
violations occurred. The mean number of violations per subject is 4. When we include the second 
and third cycles, the MPI is around 7% of the average of the income of the questions where the 
violations occurred. The mean number of violations per subject is 5.  
 
From Table 5.1 we can see the MPI for each subject. From the 41 subjects we consider that 39 are 
consistent. In Table 5.2 we resume the general results.  
Table 5.1 Results of consistency 
 Degree of the MPI 
 2nd 3rd  4th 
Number of subjects 41 41 41 
Subjects that violated GARP 2 2 2 
Median MPI 15.6% 15.3% 14.2% 
Mean MPI 15.3% 16% 16.2% 
Total possible combinations for each 
subject 820 10,660 101,270 
Median number of violations 7.0 39 146 
Mean number of violations 15.15 244.63 2,664.44 
  
As a criterion for deciding who is consistent and who is not, we chose to use the total value of the 
possible arbitrage of individuals’ inconsistent decisions, instead of the proportion that this 
arbitrage represents from the total expenditure, as some of our budget sets are very small and 
small mistakes may result in large percentages. Using Bronar´s power test we find two inconsistent 
behaviors.  
 
 
 
IV. Results 
For the set of negative slopes behavior was structured as: 
- Standard: When choices react to slopes, giving more when it is easy to give (cheaper), and 
retaining more whet it is harder to give (expensive). That behavior shows a desirable level 
of altruism or social justice concept. 16 individuals presented this behavior.   
- Egoist: When disregarding the slope, an individual constantly gives less than she retains. 
There is some level of altruism but restricted to own gains. Also 16 individuals displayed 
this behavior.       
- Rawlsian: When disregarding the slope, individuals constantly give according to a given 
slope, retaining usually as much as they give, in a Leontieff fashion. There is a strong 
aversion towards inequality, similar to the Rawlsian Maximin concept. (Rawls, 1971). Four 
individuals showed this kind of strong inequality aversion.  
 
Those where the expected behaviors to be observed, however three extreme cases where 
observed, with one individual each. 
- Purely selfish: An individual that kept all tokens, never giving away any token, even when 
it was free to do so. That is a behavior predicted by classical selfish theory, but not so 
often observed in experiments.  
- Purely altruistic: An individual that gave all tokens away, only keeping for himself when it 
could not give it away.  
- Perfect substitutes. Give all when slope is less than one, keep all if slope is equal or higher 
than one. That strategy maximizes general pay-off and expected individual profit, if 
followed by all individuals. 
For positive and non-negative slopes, behaviors were structured as: 
- Standard: Corner solutions, taking and giving as much possible. This is a classical Pareto 
optimal solution for such slopes, and shows a significant level of altruism.  
- Envy: Having the possibility to gain more giving more, the individuals restrain from giving 
when this means a higher profit to the receiver than to oneself. An inequality aversion 
towards other´s profit. Observed for horizontal and positive with the selection area below.  
- Guilt: Having the possibility to gain more, individuals restrain their own gain if it´s too high 
compared to the receiver’s profit. An inequality aversion towards own profit. Observed for 
vertical and positive with the selection area above.  
 
The results are shown in table XI 
          
Individual Negative Slopes Horizontal Positive below Vertical 
Positive 
above 
1 Standard 
2 Egoist Standard Undefined Standard 
3 Rawls Standard 
4 Standard 
5 Standard Undefined 
6 Rawls Undefined  Envy Guilt 
7 Egoist Undefined Envy Undefined 
8 Purely Selfish Envy Envy* 
9 Standard 
10 Egoist Standard Envy Guilt 
11 Rawls Standard Envy  Guilt 
12 Standard Envy Envy Undefined Guilt 
13 Egoist Standard Envy Standard Guilt 
14 Egoist Undefined Envy Standard 
15 Standard 
16 Egoist Envy Guilt 
17 Standard 
18 Egoist Standard 
19 Standard 
20 Rawls Envy Undefined 
21 Pure Altruism Guilt* Guilt 
22 Standard Envy Guilt 
23 Egoist Standard Envy Standard Guilt 
24 Inconsistent 
25 Egoist Standard Envy Standard 
26 Egoist Standard 
27 Standard Envy Guilt 
28 Egoist Engy Undefined Guilt 
29 Standard Envy Undefined 
30 Egoist Standard 
31 Standard Standard Envy Guilt 
32 Standard Envy Guilt 
33 Egoist Envy Guilt 
34 Egoist Standard Envy Standard 
35 Egoist Envy Guilt Undefined 
36 Standard Envy Guilt 
37 Perfect Substitutes Standard 
38 Standard Envy Undefined Guilt 
39 Inconsistent 
40 Standard 
41 Egoist Undefined Envy* Standard 
         
* The behavior was not expected but observed (non-used tokens).  
 For simplicity, the behavior for non-negative slopes is simplified, we consider as standard an 
individual that does not show Envy or Guilt in any moment, and as Envy, Guilt or both, if such 
behavior is observed at least once. We can consider then correlations between observed behavior, 
considering only those who were consistent and did not show extreme behaviors (36 
observations). 
 
 
        
  Standard Envy Guilt 
Standard 0.258630 -0.318529 0.037796 
Egoist -0.206904 0.254824 -0.075593 
Rawls -0.081786 0.100728 0.059761 
    
 
Those who showed an Egoist behavior at the negative slopes, tend to show also envious behaviors 
in non-negative slopes. Standard  behavior at negative slopes has also a considerable positive 
correlation with a standard behavior at non-negative slopes and an even higher negative 
correlation with envy. Guilt is not strongly correlated to any particular behavior in the negative 
slopes.    
Since at the non-negative slopes there can be more than one behavior observed, we show the 
correlation between those behaviors.  
        
  Standard Envy Guilt 
Standard 1   
Envy -0.94244 1  
Guilt -0.63539 0.55862 1 
    
To be considered standard both guilt and envy must be not present and thus the correlation is 
close to minus one, however, since they do not necessarily appear both, it’s not exactly minus one. 
There is a strong correlation between Envy and Guilt (but still less than 0.6), so they usually appear 
together.  
The choice made in the negative slopes, for those who showed consistent choices, could be 
explained using a utility approach, and thus for types of utility functions where used to estimate 
the better utility function to fit such choices, namely a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (C.E.S.), a 
logarithmical quasilinear function (for own and others payoff), and a Leontief function.  
    
Individual Observed behavior Best fit 
1 Standard Log Other 
2 Egoist Leontief 
3 Rawls Leontief 
4 Standard Log Self 
5 Standard C.E.S. 
6 Rawls Leontief 
7 Egoist Log Self 
9 Standard C.E.S. 
10 Egoist Log Self 
11 Rawls Leontief 
12 Standard Log Other 
13 Egoist Log Self 
14 Egoist Log Self 
15 Standard C.E.S. 
16 Egoist C.E.S. 
17 Standard Log Other 
18 Egoist Log Self 
19 Standard Log Other 
20 Rawls Leontief 
22 Standard Log Self 
23 Egoist Log Self 
25 Egoist Log Self 
26 Egoist C.E.S. 
27 Standard Log Self 
28 Egoist Log Self 
29 Standard Log Self 
30 Egoist Log Self 
31 Standard Log Self 
32 Standard Log Self 
33 Egoist Log Self 
34 Egoist Log Self 
35 Egoist Log Self 
36 Standard Log Other 
38 Standard C.E.S. 
40 Standard C.E.S. 
41 Egoist Log Self 
    
     
A quasilinear utility function was the more observed fit (24), being more usual to find a quasilinear 
function considering own payment as the more relevant good (19). A C.E.S was the bets fit for 7 
individuals, and a Leontief for the remaining 5.1  
Thus, for most individuals (over ½), to give away is more likely described as a luxury good in a 
quasilinear approach, keeping the necessary amount and then giving away a small surplus, at least 
at low stakes. For 1/6 of the population, a C.E.S approach was the best fit, showing a more 
balanced view between keeping and giving, while 1/9 showed a strong aversion to inequality, 
looking for a strict balance between payoffs.    
The correlations between the observed behavior for negative slopes and the utility function that 
better describes their choices is shown in table 
          
  C.E.S. Log. Self Log. Other Leontief 
Standard 0.266800 -0.273720 0.449013 -0.359211 
Egoist -0.156941 0.510114 -0.359211 -0.197566 
Rawls -0.173702 -0.373773 -0.141990 0.880341 
     
                                                          
1 All those who showed a Rawlsian behavior, unsurprisingly had the best fit with a Leontief function, 
however one of the individuals with a egoist behavior had also the best fit with a Leontief, dues the 
dispositions of her choices so close to a line that it was difficult to fit with any function, being the Leontief 
the best performing one. Rawlsian individuals where close to a Leontief with a x/y ratio close to one (a little 
skewed towards own payoff, so higher than 1), while the Egoist individual had a x/y ratio higher than 3.  
Rawlsian behavior, as expected, is strongly correlated with a Leontief utility function, while egoist 
behavior is best explained with a quasilinear function towards one self. Standard behavior is 
correlated with both quasilinear towards the receiver and slightly less with a C.E.S. utility function. 
Both Standard and Rawlsian behaviors have a negative correlation with a quasilinear utility 
function towards one self, while an egoistic behavior has a negative correlation with a quasilinear 
approach towards the receiver.  
When a Standard behavior is best explained with a C.E.S. function it shows a positive ρ  parameter, 
indication of substitution, while egoist behaviors explained by C.E.S. show a negative Rho 
parameter, indication of complementarity. When there is some degree of substitution between 
own and other´s pay-off, you react more to changes in slope, giving more away when it is cheaper, 
under complementarity that reaction to a change in the slope is considerable smaller. So even that 
both can be sometimes explained by a C.E.S. function an Egoist and a Standard behavior show 
different considerations between payoffs.  
Finally, there where the three extreme cases. Each one with a specification on their own. A perfect 
substitution function will fit perfectly the perfect substitute behavior observed. That behavior, as 
explained before, was the best strategy in terms to maximize general pay-off, so a kind of Kaldor-
Hicks improvement on general payoffs. Mathematically, if followed by all players, it maximizes the 
expected payoff before the experiment starts.  
A perfectly selfish behavior is consistent with a traditional homo-oeconomicus view point, 
considering only our own payoff, so it is a rational Nash Equilibrium for the experiment. It was 
played by an economics student.2  
There was however one slightly puzzling purely altruistic behavior.3   
 
V. Conclusions 
In this article, we have designed and conducted an economic experiment with the purpose of 
discovering individual preferences for altruism, envy and guilt. Our experiment uses a graphical 
interface that allows us to collect more and more precise information at individual level. The 
program is interactive as it changes the form of some budget sets with the answers of the subjects 
in order to better know the different emotions of each individual.  
We measure individual consistency by analyzing violations to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed 
Preferences (GARP) using the Echenique, et al.’s Money Pump Index. We find that the mean 
number of violations to GARP is 10 and each subject potentially loses on average 172 of Mexican 
pesos by their inconsistent behavior. That is, on average each subject left on the table 12 % of the 
money they could have won (or give to other players). 
                                                          
2 Most of individuals had an economic background, so it is not a relevant information per se.  
3 It might be a purely altruistic individual. She might have not care about the pay-off for some personal 
reason, so he better give it to the receiver, or she confused the axes.  
We find a high level of individual heterogeneity. However, most individuals have the emotion of 
altruism. When facing a region where other individuals have much more income than them, some 
individuals’ emotion changes to envy (19 out of 41 subjects). Surprisingly, when facing a region 
where other individuals have a much less income than them, many individuals have also the 
emotion of guilt (15 out of 41 subjects). We find that those individuals that are less altruist, and 
therefore more selfish have a tendency to have the emotion of envy. Finally, we estimate 
individuals’ utility functions for altruistic behavior.  
There are several potential extensions to our work. We could make the program more interactive, 
allowing us for example to base our program in the different techniques developed by Varian 
(1981) to reveal individual’s individual preferences. 
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